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policies are  a luxury that only industrial countries can  supporting solvency  goals and enhancing  credibility.
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exception  of Chile) that have successfully  put in place a  and institutions  in LAC to see the extent they have
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The debate on fiscal policy in Europe2 centers on how to facilitate the
workings of automatic stabilizers while achieving fiscal consolidation.  In
particular,  the discussion hinges on if the goal of "medium term" equilibrium
established in the Stability  and Growth Pact should be interpreted  as a "cyclically
adjusted structural balance,"  as Eichengreen  and Wyplosz (1998)  and a recent
IMF paper3 have argued,  and on to what extent the Maastricht  limit of 3% of GDP
for eventual  deficits4 (waived only under "exceptional  circumstances,"  such as a
contraction of 2% of more of GDP) will be enough for countries affected by
strong asymmetric shocks. In the recent past, fiscally responsible Scandinavian
countries have  run on occasion counter cyclical deficits as high as 8% of GDP.
There is indeed significant agreement within the EU on the importance of using
fiscal policy as a counter cyclical instrument, as monetary policy can no longer
play this role.
I thank the  useful comments of Nick Stern,  Luis Serven, Augusto  de la Torre, Rodrigo Suescuin,  Mauricio
Carrizosa, Sergio Schmukler and George Kopits to an earlier version of this draft.
2 For several authors these rules, more than  the currency union itself, have permitted to eliminate the
"deficit bias" and improve the fiscal stance  in some countries to such an extent that there was a significant
reduction  and convergence of interest rates before the start of the currency union. But, whatever the merits
of these fiscal rules in reducing the deficit bias and facilitating the convergence of interest rates (as
extensively discussed  in the paper by Buti, M. and Giudice, G. (2002): "EMU's Fiscal Rules: What Can
and Cannot be Exported,"  The European Commission, mimeo, February, at this Conference), there  is still a
debate about  to what extent they will permit the operation of  necessary  counter cyclical fiscal policies.
Many argue that the 3% deficit limit will prove to be too rigid, though the Commission can waive it under
exceptional circumstances).
3  Eichengreen,  B. and C. Wyplosz (1998):"Stability  Pact. More than a Minor Nuisance,"  Economic Policy,
April, and Hagemann, R. (1999):"The  Structural Budget Balance.  The IMF's Methodology,"  IMF working
paper, July.
Mercosur and  Andean countries have  recently vowed to adopt fiscal and debt convergence ceilings,
following the example of the EU, though with no enforcement  instruments (as mentioned in Buti and
Giudice,  op. cit.). The Andean Community agreement also alludes to an escape clause during recessions.In contrast, most of the discussion on fiscal policy in LAC deals just about
long term sustainability  issues, largely ignoring the effects of the economic
cycle5. This is rather surprising as LAC economies are much more volatile than
their European counterparts and have been generally applying procyclical fiscal
policies that exacerbate volatility. Some analysts and policymakers  appear to
think that counter cyclical fiscal policies are a luxury that only developed
countries can indulge in or, at least, that LAC countries (with the exception of
Chile that has successfully put in place a counter cyclical fiscal policy) need to
deal first with pressing adjustment and solvency issues before they attempt to
reduce the highly procyclical character of their fiscal policies.
In this paper I argue that this is a major mistake (in Section 2). First,
because  the costs of procyclical fiscal policies in LAC are huge in growth and
welfare  terms, specially for the poor.  But, second, because procyclical policies
and rules tend to develop a deficit bias and thus end up being non sustainable  and
non credible. I then examine,  in Section 3, the causes of the procyclicality  of
fiscal policies in LAC. In Section 4 I discuss how well designed fiscal rules may
help to deal with the political economy and credibility factors behind
procyclicality  of fiscal policies. Then, in Section 5, I examine conflicts between
flexibility and credibility in rules, showing how a good design may facilitate the
operation of automatic stabilizers, while at the same time supporting solvency
goals  and enhancing credibility. With these elements  I survey in Section 6 the
experience with different fiscal rules and institutions in LAC (Commodity
Stabilization Funds, Fiscal Responsibility  Laws, Stabilizing Transfers, the
Chilean One percent Structural  Surplus rule), analyzing to what extent they have
helped or can help to achieve the twin goals of avoiding deficit and procyclical
biases. Finally, I conclude in Section 7 with a policy proposal, which should be of
interest both for policymakers,  market participants and International Financial
Institutions.
2.  WHY CARE ABOUT FISCAL PROCYCLICALITY?
A. Excess macroeconomic volatility in LAC reduces growth and is
specially harmful  for the poor.
Volatility has been since long a trademark of LAC's economic
performance.  By whatever measure,  LAC economies have been more volatile
than those of most other developed regions  (see Figure 16), and though LAC's
volatility decreased during the nineties (Figure 2), after significant increases  in the
seventies and eighties, it remains twice as volatile as OECD countries,
5 With the major exception  of IADB-based research:  Gavin and Perotti (1996):"Fiscal  Policy in Latin
America:  Volatility, Cyclicality  and Modes of Adjustment,"  OCE working paper, IADB; Gavin, M.,  R.
Hausmann,  R. Perotti and E. Talvi (1996):"Managing Fiscal Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Volatility, Procyclicality,  and Limited Creditworthiness," OCE working paper,  IADB.
6 Taken from "Securing Our Future  in a Global Economy" by De Ferranti,  D., G. Perry, I. Gill and L.
Serven (2000), World Bank.
2significantly more volatile than South Asia and slightly more volatile than East
Asia in terms of volatility of real GDP growth. The picture is roughly the same
when macroeconomic  performance is measured by aggregate consumption  or
spending.
Economic instability can affect growth through different  channels. Most of
the existing empirical evidence  shows that this impact is generally negative.
Serven (1998) finds7 that all of his five alternative definitions of economic
instability -measured by the volatility of innovations  to macroeconomic variables
such as inflation, terms of trade, real exchange rate, growth rate and price of
capital goods- are strongly  negatively correlated with investment ratios. High
volatility also tend to skew investment towards short run gains in a non-optimal
way. Destruction of firms and banks informational  and organizational capital
during deep recessions have long lasting effects,  as Stiglitz has pointed out. There
8 can also be irreversible human capital losses, as indicated in the last WB WDR  .
This findings were corroborated for LAC by an IADB report9, which found not
only statistical evidence  of a significantly negative  effect of macro volatility  on
long term growth in the region, but also of a perverse relation between volatility
and poverty, education, income  distribution and financial deepening.
High volatility is indeed specially harmful for the poor. The poor have less
human capital to adapt to downturns in labor markets. They have less assets and
access to credit to facilitate consumption smoothing. There may be irreversible
losses in nutrition and educational levels if there are no appropriate safety nets, as
is usually the case in LAC (see below).  It should not come as a surprise, then, that
we find an asymmetric behavior of poverty levels during deep cycles: poverty
levels increase  sharply in deep  recessions and do not come back to previous
levels as output recovers  (WB WDR1 ).
B. Procyclical  fiscal  policies  may exacerbate  macro volatility in LAC
In our year 2000 Flagship publication at the Bank"1, we estimated the
causes of excess volatility in LAC, taking volatility  in OECD and East Asian
countries as a benchmark. We found that nearly  1/3 was due to exogenous  shocks
(TOT are  more volatile in LAC due to concentration  in a few commodity exports;
capital flows are also more volatile -though not as much as usually thought-); 1/3
to insufficient financial integration and development of domestic financial
markets and 1/3 to volatility in macro policies (both fiscal and monetary).  See
figure 3. The importance  of volatile monetary policies has been reduced  overtime,
but that is not the case with fiscal policies. Though the study does not identify the
7 Serven,  L. (1998):"Macroeconomic  Uncertainty and Private  Investment in LDCs:  An Empirical
Investigation,"  World  Bank working paper, September.
8  World  Bank (2000):"Attacking  Poverty," World Development Report 2000/2001.
9  "Hacia una Economfa Menos Volatil (Apendice tecnico),"  Progreso  Econ6mico y Social en America
Latina, Informe  1995, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
0World Bank (2000) op. cit.
De Ferranti  et al. (2000) op. cit.
3kind of policies explaining this result, one possible candidate  are fiscal policies
conducted in a procyclical manner.
They indeed remain highly procyclical, as found by Gavin, Hausmann,
Perotti and Talvi (1996)12,  among others. These authors show that not only fiscal
outcomes are procyclical  but that fiscal responses have deepen the cycle
particularly  during recessions when they tend to generate upright  surpluses (see
Table 1), usually after major financing crisis leave no other choice. For example,
their statistical results show that during recessions Latin American countries tend
to generate  a small surplus of 2.2 cents for every dollar of real output fall. In
contrast, OECD countries tend to generate significant counter cyclical deficits of
61 cents.
Table 1
Response of Fiscal  Balance to GDP  Growth In Good Times and Bad
High Growth  Perlods  Low Growth  Periods
OECD  Latin  OECD  LatIn
America  America
Total surplus  0.174  0.154  0.611  -0.022
Primary surplus  0.136  0.123  0.580  -0.049
Note: Number give the typical impact of a one percentage  point
increase in real  GDP on the ratio of the surplus to GDP. A
positive number for the surplus implies that it moves in  a
stabilizing direction.
Source: Gavin,  et al. (1996)
C. Procyclical  fiscal  policies add  policy risk to the income risk of the poor
Procyclical fiscal policies not only accentuate the cycle but are specially
harmful for the poor. Indeed, we have found at the Bank13 that social expenditures
are kept at best constant as a percentage of GDP during downtums, and the more
targeted  social expenditures tend to fall as a percentage of GDP, when they should
expand as the number of poor increases. As a consequence,  in a typical downturn
social expenditures per poor are reduced by 2% for each 1% of reduction in
output. By contrast, social expenditures usually grow as a percentage of GDP in
upturns, when they are less needed. That is, the procyclicality of safety nets -as a
consequence  of the procyclicality of fiscal policies- adds substantial policy risk to
12  Gavin et al. (1996) op. cit.
13 De Ferranti et al. (2000) op. cit.
4the income risk for the poor. They thus suffer both from higher consumption
losses and from higher cuts in social transfers during deep recessions.
D. Procyclical  biases usually led to deficit biases in fiscal  policies
Procyclical fiscal policies have been often found to produce a deficit bias.
Indeed, whenever countries do not generate surpluses in booms,  as they  should,
they will be forced by markets to compensate  the workings of automatic
stabilizers and  reduce deficits  by cutting expenditures during downturns (see
below).  However, there are  political and legal limits to what they can do in such
cases.  Thus the procyclical character of fiscal policies ends up generating
unsustainable  fiscal results over the cycle - as proved to be the case in several
countries in Europe (for example, Italy  and Spain) before the EU fiscal
consolidation arrangements-  and/or major macroeconomic  crisis. This has been
the experience in many Latin American countries,  most recently in Argentina,
Ecuador and Colombia in the nineties, where expansionary  fiscal policies during
booms have been followed by a deep fiscal and macroeconomic crisis in
downturns.
3.  WHAT ARE THE CAUSES  OF THE PROCYCLICAL "BIAS" OF FISCAL
POLICIES IN LAC?
As mentioned before, it has been found that fiscal policies have been
historically  strongly procyclical in the region, in sharp contrast with what  has
happened in many (though not all) OECD countries (see Table 2). During the
present downturn, only Chile -and Venezuela  due to high oil prices- have been
able to apply mild counter cyclical fiscal policies. All others have had to adopt a
strong procyclical stance.  The case of Argentina was the more dramatic example.
The  reason for this behavior is a mutually reinforcing vicious circle
conformed by the volatility of macroeconomic  outcomes, the procyclicality of the
fiscal response and the limited access to international financial markets.
Procyclicality in fiscal policies can indeed be explained by the combination of
faulty policies and weak budgetary  institutions in LAC with asymmetric
information problems in international  financial markets.
First, there  is a serious credibility problem for most LAC countries that
attempt expansionary fiscal policies in a bust. It is not only that most of them
arrive to the end of booms with fragile fiscal positions (high or moderate  deficits
and relatively  high debt stocks). There is in addition an obvious time
inconsistency problem.  Governments  may borrow today and choose not to pay
back in good times; that is, they may continue  to increase indebtedness  in good
times. Indeed, most of them have not reduced indebtedness  in past booms, so
there is no reason for a financier to expect that they would do so next time.
Almost no country in LAC but Chile have been able to run surpluses in booms,
and very few have reduced indebtedness  indicators in such episodes. Recent
5serious fiscal crises in both Colombia and Argentina can be traced to excessive
expenditure increases during the booms -that is to the incapacity to achieve  or
maintain surpluses in good times. If that is the case, expansionary policies during
bad times can be expected to lead to an intertemporally  unsustainable outcome  -a
deficit bias- and can be rightly interpreted as leading to an increase in default risk.
Table 2
Cyclical Response  of Fiscal Aggregates
Latin American and the OECD
Impact of GDP Growth
OECD  Latin
America
Total surplus  (% of GDP)  0.25  0.08
Primary surplus  (% of GDP)  0.22  0.05
Total  Revenue  (% change)  0.84  1.32
Total  Expenditure  (% change)  0.09  0.61
Note: Numbers give the typical  impact of a one percentage
point increase in  real GDP on the budget category. A
positive number for the surplus  means that it moves in  a
stabilizing  direction.
Source: Gavin,  et al. (1996)
In these conditions the proper response of responsible creditors is not to
finance an increased  deficit during busts, or to do it at significantly higher
spreads.  In summary,  the core of the problem would thus appear to be the
incapacity to maintain surpluses in good times. As Gavin et al. put it: "It is
during booms that the seeds of crisis often are sown, although the crisis
becomes  evident only when the boom subsides."
But why is fiscal policy procyclical in booms? The main reasons lie in the
political economy of fiscal policy and the lack of strong budgetary  institutions. It
is hard enough for a responsible Minister of Finance  to avoid a deficit -specially
in periods in which financing is readily available, as is usually the case in booms.
It is much harder to maintain a too visible surplus through discretionary  budgetary
decisions. As Allen Schick's paper14 in this Conference  shows, there are strong
pressures in any normal discretionary budget process to increase  expenditures.
Political incentives are aligned with spending out any potential surplus in a boom.
Such political pressures may also inhibit a responsible Minister of Finance
to indulge  in an explicit discretionary counter cyclical policy (or just to permit
automatic stabilizers to operate) during downturns,  as once the Pandora box (of a
14 Schick, A.  (2002):"Budget rules vs. Political Will," Brookins Institution, mimeo.
6deliberate  increase in expenditures or an increase in the deficit)  is opened it may
not be easy to close: the political pressures may take you too far. And besides, as
already explained, markets will punish any such move as they can not distinguish
easily between a responsible counter cyclical policy  and outright fiscal laxity.
Financial markets failures do indeed also contribute to fiscal
procyclicality. Markets often finance outright deficits in booms that exacerbate
the trend towards deficit biases.  Spreads are found to be procyclical.  Such
behavior may be explained by underlying problems of asymmetric information,
but this is not our focus here.
4.  WHY FISCAL RULES  MAY HELP
For all these reasons authorities may well want to tie their hands and resort
to automatic rules that may allow at least the automatic stabilizers to work during
the cycle, and eventually to go farther  into a regulated, rules-based counter
cyclical fiscal policy.
Such rules would help to keep any surplus in good times out of sight and
specially out of reach from the political process  in normal discretionary budgetary
decisions. But, why would they work? Why would policymakers stand by the rule
when it bites and forces though decisions that they are not able to take on their
own "free will"? Wouldn't they  resort to ignore and change the rule or at least be
tempted to "cheat" by "creative accounting"?  More precisely and to our point, are
rules capable to change the incentives  to spend out potential surpluses in good
times?
They may do that if they impose high enough exit costs, that compensate
the perverse incentives to spend coming out of the normal budgetary political
process. How can they impose high exit costs? Executive authorities will have
strong  incentives to comply with the rule if there are enforceable  penalties (as
with the Brazilian Fiscal Crimes Law) and if the rule is clear and simple enough
that it does not leave much room for cheating.  More important,  "breaking" an
explicit rule may  indeed be more costly than just indulging in silent discretionary
expansionary policies when there  are no rules, due to the visibility of  such a
decision.  This is particularly true if breaking the rule requires changing the Law
and specially if it is a Constitutional law that requires a qualified majority.
Opposition parties and the press will find in such cases a golden political
opportunity  to criticize the lack of responsibility of the governing political
coalitions. For a responsible Finance Minister such a rule is just a gift of heaven,
as it will facilitate to resist  the pressures for excessive spending in booms from
peers and politicians  and to shift to them the political cost of  an explicit break of
the rule. The experience in Chile at the beginning of the democratic period  during
a major boom in copper prices, show clearly the usefulness of a tight legal rule
for responsible economic authorities.
7So much for booms. In downtums, a well designed rule may facilitate  the
operation of automatic stabilizers  and enhance credibility to a well limited
counter cyclical fiscal policy. This will be the case  specially when the rule indeed
permitted  to obtain a surplus in the previous boom. If such surpluses were saved
in a Stabilization  Fund for bad times, the Government will have resources at its
disposal to fully or partially finance  the deficit in bad times, reducing the need to
resort to market finance in a difficult period. The fact that the deficit in the
downturn  is predictable  and limited by the rule -and that the same rule will
credibly limit spending in future booms- will give a clear signal that the
Government  is not indulging in unsustainable lax policies, but just following an
established sustainable  rule, and may help convince markets to cover any
remaining financing requirement.  In other words, financers will face clear signals
that distinguish a responsible and sustainable (limited and predictable) counter
cyclical rules based fiscal policy from outright indulgence in intertemporally
unsustainable policies. A good rule may thus help reduce problems associated
with asymmetric infornation and facilitate  financing of deficits in bad times.
In addition, such a rule will also be very helpful for a responsible Minister
of Finance to avoid expenditure pressures to run wild and thus to go too far in the
expansionary  policy in downturns.
5.  CONFLICTS BETWEEN FLEXIBILITY AND  CREDIBILITY:
TOWARDS  FISCAL RULES THAT HELP REDUCE BOTH THE
PROCYCLICAL AND  THE DEFICIT BIAS.
Any rule may entail a dilemma between flexibility and credibility. Too
rigid a rule in the pursuit of credibility may  lead to high costs in forgone
flexibility. Even more, an excessively rigid rule may become altogether non
viable. If this is the case economic actors may anticipate the non sustainability of
the rule and it will not lead to more credibility. In other words, an excessively
rigid rule may limit flexibility and not enhance credibility; it may entail only costs
and few benefits if at all. It would just be a bad rule.
I would propose that this is the case with most rigid fiscal rules that
attempt to reduce the deficit bias and thus to enhance solvency without correcting
for the potential effects of shocks and the economic cycle, as has happened with
some of the Fiscal Responsibility  and Stabilizing Transfers  Laws recently enacted
in LAC -see below-. In such cases, if there is a positive shock (an increase in the
price of oil for an oil exporting country) and/or a boom in economic activity,  the
rule will not be binding: it will be too easy to comply with, it will not help to
improve the true underlying fiscal position and will permit a procyclical fiscal
stance to accentuate the boom. On the other hand, if there is a negative shock
and/or a downtum in economic activity the rule will become excessively  tight and
would exacerbate  the downturn;  it may thus tum out to be too difficult to comply
with and abandoned altogether (as happened  in both Argentina and Peru with the
recently enacted FRL's). In other words, such rigid rules may not help avoid  a
8deficit bias precisely because they accentuate  the procyclicality  of fiscal policies.
They are just not good and useful rules.
On the other hand, a rule that attempts to support counter cyclical fiscal
policies but is not designed to achieve long term debt sustainability will also be
unsustainable and non credible. It would not serve in the end any purpose.
A well designed rule must, as a consequence,  attempt both to facilitate the
operation of automatic stabilizers (or even permit a limited active counter cyclical
fiscal policy) and avoid a deficit bias. This will by necessity make the rule
somewhat more complex, but realistic and eventually useful.
In what follows I will review some LAC attempts with fiscal rules that
have tried either to cope with pro ciclicality or with the deficit bias or both,  and
attempt to draw some practical conclusions.
6.  THE EXPERIENCE WITH FISCAL RULES IN LAC
A.  The Experience with COMMODITY STABILIZATION FUNDS
The Annex to this paper presents an analysis of the Chilean Copper
Stabilization Fund, the Colombian Coffee and Oil Stabilization Funds and the
proposed Oil Savings and Stabilization Funds in Ecuador. From this review we
can draw some general conclusions.
Stabilization Funds are easier to institute "before" the fact (when prices
are low or before expected increases in quantities take place) and, in the case of
shared revenues,  when they treat all beneficiaries  (central/federal  governments
and subnationals) in a symmetric way. This is highlighted by the experience of the
Colombian Oil Stabilization Fund and was a major political consideration in the
design of the Ecuadorian Oil Savings and Stabilization Funds.
They may indeed play a useful role to insure some savings from fiscal
revenues  associated with commodity export booms, specially where there are
automatic saving rules and the  accumulated net surplus remains "out of sight and
out of reach" of the normal discretionary budget process. This is clear in both the
cases of the Chilean Copper Stabilization Fund and the Colombian Coffee Fund
and Oil Stabilization Fund.
However, in so far as they operate over a limited portion of current
revenues, they cannot by themselves assure aggregate expenditure restraint during
booms in economic activity (as happened in Colombia during the 90s or recently
in Venezuela with the Fund for Macroeconomic  Stabilization -FAEP-).  In such
cases one may end with some savings in the Funds but at the same time with an
unsustainable deterioration of the "non-oil" budget. To avoid such a problem one
would need a complementary rule to require that "non-oil" deficits be limited to
9the interest yield of the Oil Fund (as in Norway)  or that otherwise restrict overall
expenditures.
Even when effective  in helping to keep overall expenditure  restraint in the
booms (as in the case of Chile),  if  Commodity Stabilization Funds do not include
an automatic rule for divestitures, they  may play a too limited role in helping to
execute counter cyclical policies in downturns (as happened  in 1999), as there is
no way for markets to distinguish between a responsible counter cyclical policy
and just the beginning of fiscal laxness.
All these facts conform with our previous conceptual discussion, and have
led these and other countries in the region to adopt or to plan to adopt additional
rules with broader scopes and more automatic overall expenditure  rules.
As a technical footnote, some of these attempts have eventually dealt with
the difficult issue of distinguishing between temporary and permanent shocks in
commodity prices by adopting as a reference  price a moving average of  past
prices that help both smoothing out the effect of cycles and  adapting gradually
the level of expenditures to permanent  shocks (which are welfare enhancing due
to the inefficiencies  associated with sharp increases or cuts in expenditures). For
the same reason, some (as the Colombian and Ecuadorian Oil Stabilization Funds)
have attempted to smooth out (or gradually adapt to a new level of) total revenues
from oil exports, using a moving average  of past dollar revenues  as a benchmark.
In both cases there was an explicit objective to adapt expenditures gradually to a
sharp expected  increase in the volume of exports.
But these moving average rules might be problematic when, as shown in
the empirical evidence  (see Cashin, Liang and McDermott (2000) and
Cuddington"5), commodity prices do not tend to revert towards a constant mean,
but rather tend to experience  random shocks of long durations.  This means  that
when the shocks bring the prices down, an expenditure rule based on a moving
average might lead to the exhaustion of the accumulated resources in the fund. If
the shocks to the prices are positive and long-lasting, the fund might tend to
accumulated  large savings and thus produce costs in terms of forgone investment.
Nevertheless, even  a moving average  rule might be better than no rule, given that
political pressures tend to lead to the deficit bias and the quality of public
investments tend to deteriorate  remarkably  during times of increases in the prices
of commodities (or other types of booms). Moreover,  these risks can be
ameliorated  by establishing rules that set ceilings and floors on the total savings
of the fund. More generally, fiscal rules should aim to smooth overall government
expenditures  and eliminate the deficit bias, rather than just stabilize the portion
15 Cashin,  P.,  H. Liang and J. McDermott (2000): "How Persistent are Shocks to World Commodity
Prices?," IMF Staff papers, vol. 47, #2. Cuddington, J. (1992):  "Long-run Trends in 26 Commodity Prices:
A Disaggregated Look at the Prebisch-Singe;  Hypothesis,"  Journal of Development Economics, vol. 39,
#2.
10related to commodity exports. There  are other ways to accomplish this, as I
discuss below.
B.  The Experience with FISCAL RESPONSIBILTYAND STABILIZING
TRANSFERS laws.
Recently adopted Fiscal Responsibility Laws in Brazil, Argentina and
Peru and projected ones in Colombia, Ecuador and other countries, have had as
their main objective  to help avoid deficit bias and thus achieve and maintain fiscal
solvency. I will not discuss here in detail their potential virtues with respect to
these objectives,  but just to note that in contrast to the evident failure  in the
Argentinean  and Peruvian case, the Brazilian law seems to offer more potential as
it was a product of a broad political consensus  and has been accompanied by a
Law of fiscal crimes that could effectively punish deviations from the Law.
I will refer here more to the potential  effects of these laws on the
procyclical  stance of fiscal policy. To the extent that they just set rigid specific
targets for deficits or debt levels, they may turn out to reinforce the procyclical
character of fiscal policy or become non viable. If the country in question faces an
unexpected negative  shock to its public finances -a fall in a major revenue  source
or a sharp downturn  in activity- adherence  to the rule may force authorities to cut
public spending impeding the operation of "automatic stabilizers"  and deepening
the downturn. Or else, authorities may end up not being able to comply and the
rule will be superseded,  as happened  in Argentina and Peru. A rule that does not
take into account such possibilities may end up trading long term solvency
benefits for short term costs, but it also may become non sustainable  in the long
term and thus non credible.
Some of these rules and similar legislation (specially in Argentina and
Colombia) have, however, included provisions intended to achieve some
stabilization of expenditures by States or Provinces  during the cycle,  as analyzed
by the papers by Gonzalez, Rosenblatt and Webb and by Braun and Tommasi'6 in
this Conference.  Unfortunately more often than not they have just offered  a
guarantee of minimum transfers that end up creating a serious fiscal contingency
for the Federal (central) Government. This led to the incapacity  to observe the
commitment in the case of Argentina in 2001 and may well lead to a problematic
outcome during the excessively long transition period established in the  recent
Constitutional reform in Colombia. These laws have however also contained
some more promising norms that would limit transfers (or expenditures)  to a
moving average of past transfers or expenditures)  after the "transition"  periods.
16  Gonzalez, Rosenblatt  and Webb (2002): "Stabilizing Intergovernmental  Transfers in  Latin America: A
Complement  to NationaltSubnational  Fiscal Rules,"  mimeo and Braun., M. and M. Tommasi (2002):
"Fiscal Rules  for Subnational  Governments.  Some Organizing  Principles and Some Latin American
Experiences,"  mimeo.Such a provision, applied both to National and subnational expenditures,
could go a long way to help avoid the procyclicality of fiscal policies and
facilitate  at least the operation of built-in stabilizers, while at the same time
helping to obtain solvency goals by avoiding a deficit bias. Even better, the goals
established  in such laws might be coined in terms of "structural"  balances, taking
explicit account of cycle and primary commodity price effects, as discussed
below.
C. THE CHILEAN STRUCTURAL BALANCE RULE
Chile recently adopted a more ambitious rule designed to facilitate
credible counter cyclical policies and enhance fiscal solvency. It is elegant and
simple: an explicit commitment to keep a 1% structural surplus each year. The
structural balance is estimated by removing the effects of variations in copper
prices (by using a panel of experts to estimate the long term price trend) and the
economic cycle on revenues (by using revenue elasticity estimates and a measure
of potential  GDP).
This rule will force the government  to high surpluses during booms and
high copper prices and will allow to run moderate  deficits during downtums and
low copper prices. For example, the estimated budget deficits for 2001 and 2002
are consistent with the structural surplus required by the rule.
The fact that both the size of the surplus in good times or the deficit in bad
times are constrained  and predictable,  will facilitate to curb political pressures to
either use the surpluses or enlarge the deficits (as it would imply the breaching of
the 1% surplus rule). It will also enhance the credibility of fiscal policy vis a vis
the markets -provided, of course, that results are close enough to the rule-,  as the
deficits  in bad times can be clearly anticipated and will not signal a relaxation of
the fiscal stance.
The use of this rule is helping Chile to conduct a credible counter cyclical
fiscal policy at present. As Anne Krueger praised recently in Santiago, Chile is
using "virtue with a purpose" as, in her words, fiscal conservatism  is not a
purpose on itself but a means to keep good access to markets, low interest rates
and the capacity to conduct expansionary policies in bad times.
Credibility gains from this new rule have largely been immediate, given
the track record of Chile and the fact that authorities  are using credible measures
and projections of potential output (which have been used for long for the conduct
of monetary policy) and revenue elasticities 17. Other countries  willing to follow
17 Technical problems are however non negligible. Simulations exercises indicate  that (by just using
present output gap models and revenue elasticity estimates) the potential for  counter cyclical smoothing of
the present rule would be fairly limited, as effects of the estimated cyclical adjustment would be just a
small fraction of expected  corrections related to the volatility in copper prices.  In other words, as presently
applied the rule would not do much more than what was accomplished  by the Copper Stabilization Fund.
12this example would probably have to establish first a sound analytical/statistical
basis (to be able to credibly predict or assess potential output, and to include a
correction on interest payments -which may be the most procyclical  component
of the fiscal balance,  a problem  that Chile does not face- or define the structural
balance in primary  terms -altogether  excluding interest payments18).
They should also probably adopt such a rule in good times,  so as to build
some track record before the bad times come, and establish it with force of law
and adequate enforcing (penalty for noncompliance)  measures.  Chile may also
find useful to "institutionalize"  more the rule, as at present it is just the expression
of the policy of the present government  (see figures 4 and 5).
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND A POLICY PROPOSAL.
TOWARDS  SUSTAINABLE  COUNTER CYCLICAL FISCAL POLICIES
The above discussion highlights several facts. First, that it is as important
to try to reduce procyclical bias as it is to eliminate  the deficit bias in Latin
American fiscal policies. The procyclical bias accentuates  macroeconomic
volatility, with harmful effects on growth, and hurt specially the poor, by forcing
sharp reductions in social expenditures per poor person precisely at the time when
they are most needed, thus adding unnecessary "policy risk" to the income risk of
the poor.
Second, that fiscal policies or rules must attempt to deal with both
problems at the same time. Obviously, counter cyclical policies that contribute to
a deficit bias will not be sustainable. But also, policies or rules that attempt to
reduce the deficit bias and achieve fiscal solvency while increasing procyclicality,
are likely to prove non sustainable over the medium run.
Properly designed fiscal rules may indeed help to cope with the political
economy and credibility problems that are behind the operation of procyclical
fiscal policies (and deficit biases). They may help to contain political pressures to
spend away potential surpluses in good times by tying the hands of  authorities
and keeping "surpluses"  out of reach of the political process associated with
normal discretionary budgetary practices, as long as they are successful  in
imposing high exit costs  from the rule. They can give credibility to the
sustainability of deficits in downturns if in fact they have resulted in surpluses in
upturns, and because such deficits will be entirely predictable and limited by the
rule, thus increasing the likelihood that they will be financeable  (they would be
partly or wholly financed by the savings achieved in good times). The fact that
deficits will be limited by the rule, may also help to keep pressures for excessive
deficits at bay during bad times.
18 Hausmann's paper in this Conference: "Unrewarded  Good Fiscal Behavior: The role of Debt Structure,"
show that interest payments have been the more volatile component of public expenditures in LAC.
13Of the different rules examined, the most convenient seems to be a goal of
structural balance,  or modest structural surplus, such as the one recently adopted
by Chile. Such a rule would permit full operation of automatic stabilizers during
the economic cycle and avoid sharp changes  in public expenditures  associated
with changes in fiscal revenues from commodity  exports receipts.
Other countries in the region would benefit from adopting a  similar
structural balance framework for the presentation  and discussion of their fiscal
policy, even if they do not adopt a structural balance rule. To do so, in addition to
continue improving their fiscal accounting,  they will need to have reliable
estimates of potential output and revenue elasticities.  They would also have to
develop ways to adjust for the cyclical  components in interest rates or,
alternatively,  to base their policy goals on adjusted primary balances.  IMF
assistance  could be of great help as it has developed a well tested methodology
that it regularly applies to analyze  and discuss the fiscal stance of OECD
countries. The IMF might also  consider requiring a structural balance framework
as part of the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.
Structural balance rules should form the basis of future attempts to
establish Fiscal Responsibility Laws and Stabilizing Transfers for subnationals.
Most recent designs of FRL, while already adopted or at a discussion state, rely
excessively on rigid quantitative ceilings  that do not take into account the effects
of shocks or the economic cycle.  They are thus likely to accentuate  procyclicality
of fiscal policies and to prove non sustainable in the end, as happened in
Argentina and Peru. Such a limitation may reduce ex-ante their credibility,
severely reducing their usefulness. The same can be said of recent attempts to
adopt rules for stabilizing transfers to subnationals in Argentina and Colombia:  by
instituting a long transition period of rigid quantitative targets, they can become
minimum guarantees that add to Federal  or Central Government fiscal risks.
Those countries that are not yet in the capacity of adopting credible
structural balance frameworks  and rules, may benefit from considering  more
simple rules that would limit (real) expenditure growth to a moving average of
past (real) revenue increases.  Such a simple rule (that was included for the "steady
state" in the Colombian OSF, in the Argentine FRL and the Colombian and
Argentine stabilizing transfers provisions,  though in some cases with excessively
short periods for estimating averages) would significantly reduce procyclicality  of
fiscal policies  and avoid a deficit bias.
Structural goals would be set according  to fiscal consolidation needs.
Thus, a country that starts below a sustainable structural balance should set goals
that permit a gradual approximation  to the required level. Alternatively,  it would
limit the expansion of expenditures to an increasing percentage (with a ceiling of
100%) of a moving average of  real revenue  increases. Thus, there is no need to
wait until fiscal consolidation is obtained to introduce rules that make compatible
the achievement of such goals with removing the procyclicality of fiscal policies.
14Most importantly, it would be extremely useful if the IMF (and MDB and
analysts in the private sector) decide to use systematically  a structufal balance
framework when examining and discussing the fiscal stance of all countries (as
the IMF already  do for OECD countries) and set the goals of programs
accordingly. After all, there is no good reason not to extend best practice already
applied to the first world to the analysis and design of policies in the third world.
It was most unfortunate that not only local authorities and analysts, but the IFIs
and international markets indulged in accepting and praising highly expansionary
procyclical fiscal policies in many Latin American countries (most notably in
Argentina) during the good times in the early nineties, which turned out to plant
the seeds of major fiscal crisis or at least significant fiscal stress during the bad
times after  1998. We should not repeat these mistakes in the future.
15ANNEX
THE EXPERIENCE WITH COMMODITY  STABILIZATION FUNDS
A.  The Colombian Coffee Fund
The Colombian Coffee Fund was instituted with the objective of
permitting some stabilization in the incomes of coffee growers along the cycle of
international prices, as well as to enforce commitments under the International
Coffee Quota arrangements. But it also had, as a side effect, significant fiscal
stabilization properties that became a major objective of government policy in the
eighties and early nineties. In fact, given the importance of coffee in the
Colombian economy,  booms and busts were closely associated with cycles in
international coffee prices. Taxes on coffee exports were indeed increased in
booms and reduced in busts and there were attempts to avoid procyclical "fiscal"
expenditures executed by the Fund (infrastructure  and social expenditures in
coffee producer areas).
As a para-fiscal  institution, the Coffee Fund was not included in the
Budget and was kept out of the normal fiscal political process, so their surpluses
were kept from political eyes. In 1994/95 there was a short-lived attempt to adopt
automatic rules for setting the "internal or domestic" price of the commodity
(which determines the  amount of export taxes) according to an mechanic rule.
Otherwise, this was a joint decision of the Government and the Coffee Growers
Association  through the National Coffee Committee, which was headed by the
Minister of Finance, who had veto power on this and on expenditure matters.
The Fund lost fiscal importance during the nineties,  as coffee became  less
important from a BOP and fiscal point of view, and oil took largely its place,  so
the attention changed towards the establishment of an Oil Stabilization Fund. See
below.
B. The  Chilean Copper  Fund
The Chilean Copper Stabilization Fund was created  in 1985 to help
stabilize fiscal revenues from the volatility of copper receipts. The fund was
instrumental in facilitating fiscal surplus, for example, during the second half of
the 1980s when copper prices were high. Accumulated deposits into the fund
peaked in 1997 reaching a level of US$ 3.9 billion.
It specially helped contain pressures for increased public spending at the
beginning of the new Democratic period, during a cycle of high copper prices, by
keeping  the surplus out of reach of the political pressures  inherent in the normal
budgetary process, tying the hands of the Executive  and raising the cost of
appropriating it for additional expenditures (which would have required  a change
16in the Law). Thanks to the fund government expenditures have not closely tracked
revenue availability.
The fund's saving rules were automatic, based on a moving average
reference copper price. Unfortunately,  the divestiture rules were not automatic.
Authorities found in the downtum of 1998 and 1999 that previous surpluses and
the savings in the CSF were not enough to facilitate a counter cyclical fiscal
policy. This experience led the new government  to search for new rules as we will
see below
C. The Colombian Oil Stabilization  Fund
The Colombian OSF instituted in 1995 uses automatic rules for both
savings and retirements: it requires saving excess revenues over past moving
averages,  and permits retirements up to the shortfalls of actual revenues from such
previous averages.  Savings are kept abroad and administered  by the central bank.
In this saving scheme are forced to participate  the National government, the
Colombian Petroleum Company  and subnational  govermnents located in oil
producing areas and hence with royalty rights.
It was designed to tie the hand of authorities and "hide" from political
view the expected surpluses during the impending increase in oil production and
revenues from new discoveries,  as excess revenues to be deposited  in the Fund are
not included in the budget.
Two features facilitated  political consensus.
1.  Discussion and enactment well before the increase in
revenues began to flow in: it is much easier to tie your
hands before the fact.
2.  The adoption of symmetrical rules for National and
subnational governments, which were seen as "fair"  by
Congress.
The OSF did accumulate  significant amounts. By the end of 2000
accumulated  savings reached US$1.3 billion. During this year -a year of high
prices-, US$695 million (0.80% of GDP) out of US$1800 million in oil-related
revenues were channeled  through this saving scheme by participating agents.
However,  it turned out to be less important than expected and did not
avoid  increased overall public expenditures during the boom in non-oil tax
revenues (1991/96), which led to a significant increase in the deficit in the
downturn  (96/99). Hence the present search for new rules that would cover all
revenues  and expenditures.
17D.  The Ecuadorian  proposal
Since Ecuador adopted full dollarization to stop a run on the currency  and
the banks and a hyperinflationary  burst in early 2000, many of us have been
concerned that the economy may be left to the mercy of the cycle of oil prices,
experiencing  strong booms and deep recessions. Recent high prices have indeed
led to a boom  (the fastest growing economy in LAC last year) and the
construction of a new pipeline will permit almost doubling oil exports.
The previous  Finance Minister proposed to Congress the adoption of strict
rules to manage the additional oil revenues. If approved all new revenues will go
either to a savings or to a stabilization fund.  Retirements for the budget from the
first one will be limited to interest receipts and from the second to the fall in oil
revenues from a moving average.  The Funds would avoid an excessively  rapid
build up of expenditures when the new pipeline start production, and would
improve significantly  the resilience of the economy vis a vis revenue changes  in
the future, in spite of the fact that the use of present revenues is not affected.  This
last feature may facilitate a political consensus, though it limits significantly the
counter cyclical potential  of the Fund. (Based on the Colombian experience,  the
authorities want to reinforced this saving scheme with a fiscal rule devoted  to
control overall expenditures).
18Figure 1
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Structural Balances in Argentina
Argentina:  Structural Economic Balance
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CHILE: Actual, Adjusted, Structural Balance and Total Cyclical  Budget
Components
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Note: the structural balance is derived not from the actual fiscal balance, but from the
adjusted fiscal balance.  The adjustments made to the actual balance are guided by the
objective  to better capture the net-worth of the central government'9
19 On the revenue side, privatization receipts  and other flows related to purchases and sales are subtracted,
while deposits to the copper fund are added.  On the expenditure  side, adjustments are made to ensure
accrual-based treatment of Pension Recognition Bonds.
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